Defoenet

Part VI. Production Control and Expediting.

A. Extent and Effectiveness of Use of Authority to Approve Changes in Design or Other Matters to Speed Production Without Prior Bureau Approval.

Authority to approve changes in designs without prior Bureau approval was not used extensively.
This is usually a dangerous practice, when allowed on a standard design of a large number of similar ships built at different yards, because every time an authorized change involving military characteristics is required, previously unauthorized changes almost invariably cause interferences and run into many costly complications.
This authority should be used with great caution and normally only on minor matters, or in special cases where the urgency of getting something out in a hurry takes priority over getting it out exactly according to plan. In normal conditions any alteration requiring a plan change should be taken up with the Bureau, or design agent, for evaluation for advantages, interferences, practicability, and adoption as a class item.

B. Extent to Which Office Became Involved in General Production Problems Such as Manpower, Labor Relations or Finance. Contributions of Office.

This office was involved on several occasions in which sub-contractors requested help in obtaining men of certain trades in order to build up production to schedules. Two cases in particular will be noted.
When Whitehead and Kales were awarded their subcontract on LCI(L) hull sections, on top of their continuing DE work, they required many additional welders. This required the cooperation of this office and the Navy manpower representative in Detroit with the War Manpower Commission, to obtain the authority and to help provide the workers.
The Nicholson Terminal and Dock Co. of Ecorse had great difficulty in employing experienced pipefitters and electricians to carry on their P.C. completion subcontract. This office aided in every way possible to help them obtain the needed men.
The Defoe Shipbuilding Co. apparently had an effective employment organization, and the chief cooperation of this office in connection with their manpower was in our efforts to aid them in retaining key men who were called in the draft.
Only on rare occasions was this office asked for assistance in labor relation difficulties. Valuable assistance was generally given by the District Labor Relations Office assistant, Lt. Comdr. R. H. Peters, D-V(S), USNR, of the Detroit-Cleveland Area, with offices in Detroit.
No extensive work stoppages occurred at the Defoe Shipbuilding Co. There was one short strike of one week’s duration, 29 October to 5 November 1941, over the questions of choice of union, closed shop and check-off agreements, but no work stoppage occurred during the war period, although there were some threats of work stoppages.
This office was not involved in any financial relations, although it was aware that some of the smaller contractors were often in financial difficulties.

C. Extent to Which Yards Learned to Use the Office, and Extent to Which They Went Straight to the Bureau or Other Higher Authority.

Information now available on this subject is rather meager. It is known that the contractors’ representatives made numerous trips to the Bureau of Ships, but it is believed these visits were usually in connection with negotiations for new contracts, or in connection with contractual matters, and usually at the request of Bureau Officers. It is believed that it would have been advisable to have had a representative of this office present at all such conferences, as the agreements and decisions were not always completely transcribed and furnished this office for its information and files. In some cases it was embarrassing when this office did not know the details of contract negotiations. The field office should not be dependent on the contractor for such information. See also Algonac History, Exhibit No. 2, page 12.
The Assistant Supervisor of Shipbuilding at Algonac had experiences of subcontractors going to the Bureau over his head. See Algonac History, Exhibit No. 2, pages 27–29.

D. Evaluation of Scheduling and Material Controls Set Up by Bureau or WPB from Point of View of the Field. Special Emphasis on the Effect of the Adoption of CMP as Seen in the Field.

The field operation of the “Controlled Materials Plan” as it was finally simplified proved to be of great value in obtaining the cooperation and compliance of the individual shipyards under the cognizance of the Supervisor through the less complicated requirements on the contractors involved and the expeditious action possible on emergency requests when necessary.
The evaluation of allotment requests and the education of the several contractors to the necessity of a centralized control of the basic critical materials were developed together, and although the tendency of several contractors was to minimize the practicability of operating under the instructions indicated by a particular bill of material and the 60-day inventory limit, cooperation and close compliance was for the most part achieved and the authority delegated to the field was in a great measure responsible for its success. The factors of speed, flexibility and results obtained from the operation of the basic plan, soon “sold” the contractors involved by reason of the fact that vital materials were delivered to the high-priority programs.
Bureau of Ships scheduling procedures for main ship-board components were an important contribution to the success of the overall shipbuilding program, but in many instances the program broke down and valuable time was wasted for several reasons, the most obvious one being the time consumed in obtaining accurate reports from both the shipyards and the component manufacturers and then coordinating and scheduling production against requirements. Streamlining the procedures to insure speed and accuracy is recommended.
A tendency was noted in some cases for yards to submit super-optimistic ship construction schedules in order to obtain early deliveries of scheduled critical items. One case in point, involving this yard, was with the late YP 852–890 program. The awards were made to four yards on September 2, 18, October 5 and 11, 1944 respectively.
On one particular item, i.e. cargo winches, the Defoe yard was purchasing their equipment from the same company, the New England Trawler Co., as the Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co. for their YP 861–870. Defoe was also in competition with all other yards on certain government-supplied items, in particular the fire pumps, which were very critical.
On the first monthly progress report on which all yards submitted dates (1 November 1944) the Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co. yard submitted completion dates ranging from 3-20-45 to 4-14-45. Defoe’s dates were 4-25 to 8-2-45. Missouri Valley vessels had precedence numbers of 2615 to 3179 for October, November and December 1944. (Defoe and Ambridge had no precedence numbers until 1 January 1945, because their contracts were awarded after 1 October).

The changes of predicted dates of completion with advancing progress report dates, and the corresponding precedence numbers are shown every three months in the following table. (For simplification, no reference is made to YP 858–860, transferred from Erie Concrete & Steel to Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., in April 1945 and later cancelled).

	Oct. 1, ’44	Jan. 1, ’45	Apr. 1, ’45	July 1, ’45	Actual*
End of Construction – YF 861–870 Mo. V. B. & I. Co.
First	3-20-45	5-10-45	6-16-45	8-28-45	10-29-45*
Last	4-14-45	5-24-45	7-3-45	9-29-45	12-6-45*
Precedence
First	2615	1959	419	403
Last	3179	2001	505	489
End of Construction – YF 881–890 Defoe Shipbuilding Co.
First	4-25-45	4-25-45	6-18-45*	6-18-45*
Last	8-2-45	8-2-45	8-30-45	10-29-45*
Precedence
First	1933	325	206
Last	2690	1619	396

Defoe’s first YF was launched on 12 April, and the last vessel was launched on 30 June 1945, but they could not make their completion dates because of lack of materials. (The first Mo. V. YF was launched 10-3-45). Defoe’s last regular YF (#887) was delivered 8-13-45. The last three refrigerated YFs were further delayed by lack of special materials for the refrigeration system, but the last vessel was delivered on 29 October 1945, the same day Missouri Valley B. & I. Co. delivered their first vessel. (Missouri Valley delivered their last vessel on 6 Dec. 1945).
Neither yard was able to make their predicted dates, but the figures clearly show how much more realistic were the first figures given by Defoe compared to those of the Missouri Valley B. & I. Co.
It is true that the early schedule unfair allocations were corrected by the revision of the precedence numbers every three months, but this meant many interim worries and frequent revamping of shipping schedules.

E. Evaluation of Experience in Expediting Special Programs.

Expediting and material procurement. Early in the life of this office, in an effort to be of assistance to the various contractors, a share of the burden of expediting of, and search for, materials was assumed by the Supervisor’s organization. As the programs grew and delivery schedules grew tighter, the contractors tended to rely more and more on the material section for this work.
Early in 1944, at the Supervisor’s insistence, one contractor in particular (Defoe) set up an expediting section, and with the aid of the material section, procedures were established whereby a greater share of the burden was assumed by the shipbuilder, as a part of his contractual obligation.
The material section continued to aid extensively, but only after the contractor had done all in his power to solve the problem, and consequently the efforts were to a large part concentrated on only those situations which were or threatened to become critical.
Special expediting, such as the Destroyer Escort program, handled by the Material Contracting Agency, New York, was of definite value in general, yet extensive records and much time and effort were required on the part of the Supervisor’s organization to make certain that the coordination efforts were realized at and by the particular building program over which he was cognizant.

F. Relations with INS’s in Production and Procurement Matters.

This activity’s relations with INS in production matters were in general quite satisfactory. A number of particular criticisms might be enumerated, however in most instances these fall under the general category of administrative break-downs due to “red tape,” and after the particular problem was taken directly to the individual concerned the matter was soon straightened out. In those offices which established a more decentralized inspection organization with a broad delegation of authority such break-downs were mitigated.